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parently diminishing forms such as the American labor union. Our focus
in this paper—the eﬀect of labor unions on a variety of nonwage aspects
of work—is a small, yet important, aspect of the recent history of Ameri-
can unionism.
The importance of nonwage aspects of jobs to union goals dates back to
the origins of the modern labor movement in the United States and other
countries. For example, in late nineteenth-century Britain, according to
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, “the prospect of securing support in sickness
or unemployment [was] a greater inducement [for young men] to join the
union . . . than the less obvious advantages to be gained by the trade com-
bination” (Webb and Webb 1897, 158). Similarly, in the United States, to
take a prominent example, the American Federation of Labor’s resolution
that “eight hours shall constitute a legal day’s labor from and after May 1st,
1886” was one impetus for the Haymarket Rebellion—an event which is
still commemorated in much of the world as International Worker’s Day.
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on a previous draft.wage aspects of jobs, union goals and impacts may have changed as union
density and inﬂuence have declined. Using data from a variety of data-
bases, we investigate the following questions: How do the nonwage aspects
of union jobs diﬀer from those of nonunion jobs? Have these diﬀerences
changed during the past several decades? We ﬁrst document and describe
diﬀerences in hours worked in union and nonunion jobs. We then provide
an updated assessment of union impacts on the provision of various fringe
beneﬁts, addressed for an earlier period in various studies (most compre-
hensively by Freeman and Medoﬀ 1984).
7.1 Background
If only a single bit of context is to be highlighted about the role of today’s
unions, surely it is the decline in union representation. The fraction of
workers currently represented by a labor union is at roughly the same level
as it was before the passage of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act
in 1935. The Wagner Act declared that it was U.S. policy “to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free ﬂow of commerce and
to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining” (see the
National Labor Relations Board website at http://www.nlrb.gov). After a
rapid spurt of growth between 1935 and 1945, unionization rates remained
roughly level until the late 1950s. Since the 1960s, unionization rates have
fallen almost continuously.1
Following the publication of Lewis (1963), a comprehensive study of
union/nonunion wage gaps, years of subsequent research provided ample
quantitative evidence of wage premia associated with unionization. As to
beneﬁts, a simple summary of the ﬁndings in the review by Freeman and
Medoﬀ (1984) is that ceteris paribus, union jobs provide more generous
beneﬁts. Current union density, however, is about half as large as it was at
that time, which raises the possibility that union impacts on beneﬁt provi-
sion may have changed as well.
Some indirect evidence regarding possibly changing union impacts on
beneﬁts comes from recent work on the causes of rising wage inequality
(Bound and Johnson 1992; Katz and Murphy 1992; Autor and Katz 2000;
Levy and Murnane 1992; Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 2003). Unionization
has traditionally been an equalizing inﬂuence, reducing both inequality be-
tween groups with diﬀerent demographic characteristics and inequality
within demographically homogeneous groups. Unions have typically re-
duced between inequality by raising the relative pay of groups with low
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1. Although it might be tempting to predict continued declines, the certainty of such a fore-
cast should be tempered by the striking similarity of the recent time series path of unioniza-
tion to that in 1935. In particular, despite years of decline prior to the Wagner Act, during the
subsequent ten years the union membership rate doubled.earnings; for example, unionization rates typically are higher among the
less educated. Given this equalizing eﬀect of unions, declining unioniza-
tion might be expected to increase between inequality, and the evidence
bears this out.2Because unions also tend to compress pay schedules within
groups, a decline in the power of unions to aﬀect wages also should lead to
increased within-group inequality. Indeed, deunionization has coincided
with an increase in within inequality not only because fewer workers are
covered but also because the distribution of wages in the union sector in-
creasingly resembles that of the nonunion sector (DiNardo and Lemieux
1997). That is, the ability of unions to minimize diﬀerences in wages be-
tween demographically similar workers has declined. The changing impact
of unions on the wage distribution suggests the possibility of changing
union impacts on nonwage aspects of jobs as well.
7.2 Union Eﬀects on Hours of Work
Comparatively little has been written about union/nonunion diﬀerences
in hours worked for employed individuals. Neither of Lewis’s (1963, 1986)
comprehensive surveys address the issue at any length; the same is true for
more broadly focused summaries of research on labor unions (Freeman
and Medoﬀ 1984; Hirsch and Addison 1986), although Freeman and
Medoﬀ investigate the cyclical sensitivity of union employment (see Rai-
sian [1979] for a similar focus). Killingsworth’s (1983) extensive survey
makes no mention of labor supplied in the presence of unionization. Earle
and Pencavel (1990) examine the question with the 1978 Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) and time series data. They ﬁnd conﬂicting evidence—
negative union impacts on full-time hours worked in time series data but
positive union eﬀects on total hours worked for some groups (white male
laborers and women) in the cross section. In contrast to their cross-section
ﬁndings, Trejo (1993) found negative union impacts on hours worked us-
ing 1985 CPS data. The most comprehensive study of the question across
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries is Blanchﬂower (1996) who found, inter alia, that unions reduce
total hours of work in the full set of OECD countries analyzed.
The most severe obstacle to such an analysis is the comparatively poor
quality of information on hours worked. Moreover, a fuller analysis would
incorporate related aspects of time use, such as commuting time. Unfortu-
nately, we are unaware of any data set that allows for a comparison across
time in hours worked of the same quality (and quantity) as, say, the wage
data in the CPS.
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2. See DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996); Card (1992); and Freeman (1993) for the
United States and Gosling and Machin (1995) for the United Kingdom.7.2.1 The Economics of Hours Reductions
Before turning to our empirical analysis, it is helpful to motivate why one
might see diﬀerences in hours worked between the union and nonunion
sectors. The textbook monopoly union model generally is silent regarding
the eﬀect of unionization on hours worked, treating hours per worker as
ﬁxed, and focusing on the number of workers employed. In this type of
model the main consequence of unionization is lower employment.
By contrast, in eﬃcient contract models (Brown and Ashenfelter 1986;
MaCurdy and Pencavel 1986) the relationship between the union and the
ﬁrm is oriented around rent sharing. In these models, the union maximizes
the joint revenue of the ﬁrm and the workers—the wage is merely an arti-
fact of the division of this revenue between the two groups. In appendix A
we present a version of the eﬃcient contract model to motivate the possible
economic logic of a diﬀerence in hours worked between union and non-
union workers. Our intent is not to test an obviously simplistic model of
union hours determination.3Instead, we use the model to highlight one pos-
sible trade-oﬀthat employers and union workers face in collective bargain-
ing—the trade-oﬀ between a larger number of members splitting smaller
shares of the “economic pie” versus fewer members with larger shares. 
This trade-oﬀ arises because increases in labor supplied to ﬁrms can 
come either through an increase in the number of workers employed or 
an increase in hours worked per employee. As derived in the model, com-
pared to a nonunion setting, an optimal union contract typically results in
(1) fewer hours per worker and (2) union members being constrained to
work fewer hours than they would like to at the negotiated wage rate (de-
spite being better oﬀ as union members than as nonmembers).
In the model, the magnitude of these eﬀects will depend on the extent to
which the wage-setting process diﬀers between the union and nonunion
settings. The more union wage setting resembles wage setting in the “com-
petitive” sector (the smaller the diﬀerence between union member utility
and the nonunion alternative), the smaller is the hours diﬀerential and the
less “constrained” is the union hours outcome. Thus, given the decline in
the level of unionization in the United States and the implied decline in
union power, it may be reasonable to expect the size of the union eﬀect to
decline over time as well.
7.2.2 The Data
Our analysis of the impact of unions on hours worked relies on two data
sources. The Current Population Survey (CPS) is the federal government’s
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3. Booth (1995), among others, has argued that tests of eﬃcient contract models, such as
those employed in Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), are ﬂawed because it is not possible to em-
pirically distinguish between the monopoly union and eﬃcient contracting views using data
on employment and wages. She notes that in the absence of such a test, a “pragmatic ap-
proach” would rely on studying the texts of collective bargaining agreements instead.monthly survey of about 60,000 households, which provides information
on labor force activities, earnings, and related variables for a rotating cross
section designed to be representative of the U.S. population. We use data
from the Annual Demographic Supplement (March) to the monthly CPS,
which provides information on income and work hours during the com-
plete calendar year preceding the survey. We also use data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a panel study of 5,000 families initi-
ated in 1968. Each year, the original sample of families and their “splitoﬀs”
(for example, children who leave to form their own households) are rein-
terviewed; sample attrition has been relatively limited over time, and new
families are added when necessary to keep the sample approximately rep-
resentative of the nation as a whole.4
Relative to the March CPS data, the PSID has some unique advantages
and disadvantages in regard to estimating the eﬀect of union status on
hours worked.
The main advantage of the PSID is its collection of information that pro-
vides a complete yearly calendar for each individual; this calendar indi-
cates the total amount of weeks spent at work, on vacation, unemployed,
on strike, or away from work due to personal illness or the illness of a fam-
ily member. Despite some ambiguity in the questions, the response ac-
curacy is enhanced through the survey requirement that the interviewer
readminister the questions until the responses add up to ﬁfty-two. This is
important given the well-known problems of measurement error in data on
hours and weeks worked.5
In contrast, the March CPS includes “paid” vacation as part of weeks
“worked.” This complicates use of the CPS in several ways. Consider a per-
son with two weeks’ paid vacation (and no unpaid vacation time). The es-
timate of annual hours is ﬁfty-two times average hours per week, instead of
ﬁfty times average hours per week. Arguably, use of the March CPS leads
to systematic underreporting of the hours diﬀerential if vacation time is
more generous for union workers (as we document in the following, this ap-
pears to be the case).
A main disadvantage of the PSID is inconsistency across respondents in
their answers to the question regarding “average hours per week”—some
respondents appear to base their answer on a “typical” work week rather
than a true average. Other problems in the PSID include the comparatively
small size of the sample, the lack of information on nonhousehold heads,
and the lack of statistical dependence in successive years of data for each
panel member.6
In the following analyses, we use PSID data for the years 1972–1992 and
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4. To enhance our sample’s representation of the general U.S. population, we do not include
the low-income oversample in the analyses below.
5. See Bound and Krueger (1991) for one illustration.
6. For example, we restrict our analyses to men because most of the detailed information
on work time is not available for the “wife” of the household.CPS data for the years 1983–1997. Although our preference was for an ex-
act match of sample years for both sources, our choice was dictated by data
availability constraints in the PSID.7
7.2.3 Methodology
An important aspect of the hours data that we analyze in this section is
that it is either multimodal (often at 0 and another value) or otherwise dis-
tributed in a way that precludes the use of straightforward regression tech-
niques to characterize the conditional distribution. Olson (1998) faced a
similar problem in his study of the eﬀects of health insurance on hours
worked and found that conventional regression estimates tend to produce
misleading results.
Following Olson (1998) and Buchmueller, DiNardo, and Valletta (2002),
we apply the reweighting techniques from DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux
(1996) to adjust the union and nonunion distribution for diﬀerences in
worker characteristics. That is, we adjust the average hours of a typical
worker relative to some base set of characteristics, speciﬁcally the charac-
teristics of a typical worker in 1992. This technique, which relies on the es-
timation of “conditioning weights,” allows us to estimate the conditional
impact of unionism on hours worked without imposing any misleading dis-
tributional assumptions on the data; appendix B describes this method in
detail. Stated simply, given our data structure, it is easier to estimate the re-
lationship between union status and related variables and use this relation-
ship to adjust the hours data rather than applying the ﬂexible functional
forms needed to directly estimate the conditional impact of union status on
hours worked. In the case where our estimated conditioning weights are
based on a partition of discrete groups (such as union and nonunion work-
ers), our procedure amounts to calculating simple diﬀerences in means for
the various groups and then appropriately weighting them to form an over-
all average. This can be viewed as an application of propensity score
weighting as in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). We apply this technique to
estimate union/nonunion diﬀerences for each of the hours measured dis-
cussed in this section and listed in tables 7.1–7.5. As discussed in more
detail in the appendix, we use a complete set of race dummies, school dum-
mies, marital status dummies, standard metropolitan statistical area
(SMSA) dummies, and a cubic in age as explanatory variables for the PSID
data. For the CPS data we use ﬁve education categories, ﬁve age categories,
an SMSA dummy, three regional dummies, marital status, and three race
categories.
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7. We assume that the design changes in the CPS questionnaire after 1993 are ignorable in
the context of our analyses.7.2.4 Results
Hours
Our estimates of the union impact on “average weekly hours” (PSID)
and “usual weekly hours” (CPS) are presented in tables 7.1 and 7.2. The
ﬁrst column of table 7.1 lists the mean hours for nonunion workers in a
given year in the PSID, calculated as if they had the characteristics of union
workers in the 1992 sample. The second column lists the mean for union
workers in a given year, also calculated as if they had the characteristics of
union workers in 1992; our estimate for 1992 union workers, therefore, is
the unadjusted mean from the data (using the appropriate population
weights). The third column in the table lists the diﬀerences between the ﬁrst
two columns; under our estimation procedure, this represents the eﬀect on
nonunion status on hours worked, conditional on a set of covariates used
to estimate the conditioning weights (we include controls for a standard set
of individual characteristics; see the end of appendix B for a complete list).
The format for the CPS results is similar. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 display the
PSID and CPS results (ﬁrst two columns) graphically.
Considering the PSID estimates ﬁrst, in almost all years union workers
work fewer hours per week than do nonunion workers; during the years
1972–1984, this diﬀerence is about three hours per week. After 1984 the
diﬀerential begins falling, and by 1992 the situation is reversed, with union
workers estimated to work about one hour more per week than nonunion
workers. However, the standard errors listed in these tables indicate that
the union/nonunion diﬀerences generally are not statistically signiﬁcant
after 1984.8
In table 7.2, we present results based on the CPS data, again using the
1992 union worker as our basis of comparison. The estimates for nonunion
workers (appropriately weighted) hover around 42.2 hours per week, and
the estimates for union workers are approximately 0.5 hours per week
lower. By comparison with the PSID results, the CPS-based estimates of
usual weekly hours for nonunion workers are slightly higher in general, al-
though the diﬀerential between the two sectors is relatively constant.9
The diﬀerences between the PSID and CPS estimates could arise from a
number of sources. Part of the diﬀerence is surely diﬀerences in the word-
ing of the questionnaires as well as sampling error due to the comparatively
small size of the PSID. Another salient diﬀerence is that with both data sets
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8. The standard errors listed probably understate the true sampling errors because they
were not adjusted for the uncertainty generated by estimation of the conditioning weights nor
for the nonindependence of multiple observations per individual in the PSID data.
9. Although problems of sample selectivity and limitations of scope preclude an extensive
analysis here, the relationship between union and nonunion workers is reversed when women
are included in the sample (Earle and Pencavel 1990).Table 7.1 Mean average hours per week for men with characteristics of 1992 union
workers (PSID data)
Year Nonunion Union Diﬀerence
1972 45.16 41.95 3.20
(0.29) (0.43) (0.52)
1973 45.43 42.61 2.81
(0.27) (0.41) (0.49)
1974 45.09 41.82 3.26
(0.26) (0.34) (0.43)
1975 44.89 38.82 6.07
(0.29) (0.43) (0.52)
1976 44.67 40.70 3.97
(0.28) (0.38) (0.47)
1977 44.57 39.60 4.98
(0.27) (0.44) (0.51)
1978 44.39 41.54 2.85
(0.26) (0.31) (0.40)
1979 44.17 41.20 2.97
(0.26) (0.34) (0.43)
1980 44.02 40.21 3.81
(0.26) (0.37) (0.45)
1981 44.00 41.27 2.73
(0.25) (0.37) (0.45)
1982 44.31 40.52 3.79
(0.23) (0.41) (0.47)
1983 44.04 40.32 3.72
(0.23) (0.39) (0.46)
1984 43.71 40.73 2.98
(0.23) (0.41) (0.47)
1985 42.99 41.39 1.60
(0.27) (0.37) (0.46)
1986 42.54 42.65 –0.10
(0.27) (0.25) (0.37)
1987 42.57 42.20 0.38
(0.27) (0.33) (0.43)
1988 42.71 41.75 0.96
(0.26) (0.36) (0.45)
1989 42.56 41.44 1.11
(0.25) (0.43) (0.50)
1990 42.31 42.92 –0.61
(0.25) (0.35) (0.43)
1991 41.98 42.68 –0.70
(0.25) (0.37) (0.45)
1992 41.86 42.92 –1.06
(0.25) (0.41) (0.48)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. For description of counterfactual weights see text.the variability in weekly hours is substantially higher in the nonunion sec-
tor. To give the reader some sense of the diﬀerence, we display the standard
deviation of hours worked from our CPS data in ﬁgure 7.3. The variability
across workers is fairly constant for the nonunion sector, although it ap-
pears to be increasing in the union sector—the relative increase in union
sector variance is consistent with other evidence, suggesting that union
wage setting is growing more like nonunion wage setting (DiNardo and
Lemieux 1997).
Figure 7.4 uses the propensity score (the predicted probability from the
logit that we use for our weights) to take a ﬁrst pass at investigating het-
erogeneity (e.g., variability) in the union eﬀect across diﬀerent groups of
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Table 7.2 Mean average hours per week for men with characteristics of 1997 union
workers (CPS data)
Year Nonunion Union Diﬀerence
1983 41.33 40.50 0.83
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
1984 41.67 41.03 0.64
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
1985 41.82 41.15 0.66
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
1986 41.81 41.21 0.60
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
1987 42.02 41.37 0.65
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
1988 42.05 41.46 0.58
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
1989 42.21 41.57 0.63
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
1990 42.19 41.47 0.71
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
1991 41.88 41.28 0.60
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
1992 41.84 41.41 0.43
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
1993 41.94 41.61 0.34
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
1994 42.15 41.56 0.59
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08)
1995 42.20 41.89 0.32
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08)
1996 42.33 41.76 0.57
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08)
1997 42.30 41.84 0.45
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. For description of counterfactual weights see text.male workers in the 1992 CPS cross section. Workers with characteristics
“more like” union members have higher values of this propensity score.10
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Fig. 7.1 Average hours per week for men with characteristics of 1992 union 
workers PSID data
Fig. 7.2 Average hours per week for men with characteristics of 1992 union 
workers CPS data
10. The actual regression lines are the result of a natural cubic spline with knots at the 33rd
and 66th percentile of the observed propensity score. Experimentation with nonparametric
estimates and regressograms conﬁrmed the adequacy of the natural cubic spline to ﬁt the
data.We restrict our attention in the ﬁgure to the domain between the 5th and
95th percentile of propensity scores.11
The analysis suggests some variation in the size of the union eﬀect, with
the eﬀect being greater for workers who look more like the “typical union
worker.” On the other hand, the amount of variation explained by the
propensity score is tiny. Depending on the precise speciﬁcation of the pro-
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Fig. 7.3 Standard deviation of hours per week men with characteristics of 1992
union workers CPS data
Fig. 7.4 Average weekly hours and union propensity score
Note: Plots are generated with a natural cubic spline with knot points at the 33rd and 66th
percentiles of the propensity score.
11. Outside this range, the union hours eﬀect is actually reversed; however, our estimates in
this range are very unreliable due to the paucity of observations.pensity score, the total variation in hours explained is typically less than 8
percent. This is not surprising given the fact that the literature on labor
supply (see, for example, Killingsworth 1983), which typically conditions
on the observed wage in addition to the covariates that we use, has only
managed to explain a tiny fraction of the variation in hours worked.
In sum, both the PSID and CPS results suggest that hours are lower in
the union sector, although there are some diﬀerences in the levels, diﬀer-
ences, and trends between the two sets of numbers.
Time Spent Due to Illness (Own or Other)
Based on our PSID data, table 7.3 reports the average number of weeks
spent not working due to illness, with the nonunion and union values com-
puted as before (i.e., with the characteristics of union workers in 1992 used
as the adjustment base). In general, nonunion workers spend slightly less
time away from work due to illness—approximately 1 week per year com-
pared to 1 to 1.4 weeks for union members. This diﬀerential is somewhat
consistent with our evidence regarding “paid” sick leave, presented in the
following (see table 7.10 later in the chapter). While the magnitude of the
diﬀerence varies from year to year, there is no discernible trend.
Time Spent on Vacation
Recall from our earlier discussion that the treatment of paid vacation
time as time spent at work makes the use of the CPS problematic for an
analysis of union/nonunion diﬀerences: Indeed, as we show later in the
chapter (see Table 7.10), there appears to be a diﬀerence in the incidence of
“paid” vacation time between union and nonunion workers. We therefore
use only the PSID—which records all vacation time whether paid or not—
for this analysis. These results are listed in table 7.4 (again estimated using
our conditioning technique).
Given the relatively small samples, it is noteworthy that the diﬀerence
between the two groups of workers is fairly constant—union workers typ-
ically have one week more vacation time than nonunion workers and, per-
haps surprisingly, the level of vacation time in the two groups rose during
the years 1972–1992 (albeit slowly).
Hours Constraints
In table 7.5, we list the percentage of workers who report that they
“would like to work more” and those who “would like to work less” (the
worker is also free to choose neither more nor less.) During the sample pe-
riod, two trends are immediately evident for both sets of workers—the per-
centage of workers who say they would like to work more rises, and the per-
centage of workers who would like to work less falls. Consistent with the
previous tables and with our simple model of union behavior, during the
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1992 union workers (PSID data)
Year Nonunion Union Diﬀerence
1972 0.92 1.23 –0.31
(0.06) (0.11) (0.12)
1973 0.96 1.06 –0.10
(0.06) (0.10) (0.11)
1974 0.83 1.18 –0.35
(0.05) (0.12) (0.13)
1975 1.12 1.23 –0.11
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
1976 1.07 1.36 –0.29
(0.06) (0.09) (0.10)
1977 1.06 1.37 –0.31
(0.05) (0.09) (0.10)
1978 1.15 1.27 –0.12
(0.06) (0.09) (0.10)
1979 1.22 1.24 –0.02
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10)
1980 1.12 1.32 –0.20
(0.05) (0.09) (0.10)
1981 1.15 1.32 –0.17
(0.05) (0.09) (0.10)
1982 1.13 1.26 –0.14
(0.05) (0.09) (0.11)
1983 1.15 1.43 –0.29
(0.05) (0.11) (0.12)
1984 1.17 1.56 –0.39
(0.05) (0.13) (0.14)
1985 1.26 1.22 0.04
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11)
1986 1.09 1.34 –0.25
(0.06) (0.12) (0.13)
1987 1.08 1.33 –0.25
(0.06) (0.10) (0.11)
1988 1.05 1.30 –0.25
(0.05) (0.11) (0.12)
1989 1.02 1.27 –0.25
(0.05) (0.10) (0.12)
1990 1.05 1.18 –0.13
(0.05) (0.12) (0.13)
1991 1.10 1.43 –0.34
(0.05) (0.15) (0.16)
1992 1.15 1.21 –0.06
(0.05) (0.14) (0.15)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. For description of counterfactual weights see text.Table 7.4 Mean vacation time in weeks for men with characteristics of 1992 union
workers (PSID data)
Year Nonunion Union Diﬀerence
1972 1.71 2.17 –0.46
(0.06) (0.09) (0.11)
1973 1.71 2.18 –0.47
(0.06) (0.09) (0.11)
1974 1.77 2.16 –0.39
(0.06) (0.09) (0.11)
1975 1.93 2.37 –0.44
(0.06) (0.09) (0.11)
1976 1.94 2.42 –0.48
(0.05) (0.09) (0.11)
1977 1.99 2.49 –0.50
(0.05) (0.10) (0.11)
1978 1.97 2.55 –0.58
(0.05) (0.10) (0.11)
1979 1.99 2.44 –0.46
(0.05) (0.10) (0.11)
1980 2.03 2.53 –0.50
(0.05) (0.10) (0.11)
1981 2.09 2.46 –0.38
(0.05) (0.10) (0.11)
1982 2.10 2.51 –0.41
(0.05) (0.11) (0.12)
1983 2.09 2.69 –0.59
(0.05) (0.12) (0.13)
1984 2.14 2.56 –0.43
(0.05) (0.12) (0.13)
1985 2.34 2.88 –0.54
(0.07) (0.10) (0.12)
1986 2.35 2.98 –0.63
(0.07) (0.12) (0.13)
1987 2.34 2.96 –0.62
(0.07) (0.12) (0.13)
1988 2.36 2.91 –0.56
(0.06) (0.12) (0.14)
1989 2.40 2.93 –0.53
(0.06) (0.12) (0.14)
1990 2.36 2.87 –0.51
(0.06) (0.12) (0.13)
1991 2.39 2.80 –0.41
(0.06) (0.12) (0.13)
1992 2.31 3.27 –0.96
(0.05) (0.15) (0.15)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. For description of counterfactual weights see text.Table 7.5 Percent saying “Would like to work more” or “Would like to work less”
for men with characteristics of 1992 union workers
Would like to work more Would like to work less
Year Nonunion Union Diﬀerence Nonunion Union Diﬀerence
1972 0.17 0.24 –0.06 0.08 0.06 0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1973 0.15 0.26 –0.11 0.10 0.07 0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1974 0.15 0.25 –0.10 0.08 0.07 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1975 0.17 0.34 –0.16 0.07 0.09 –0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1976 0.25 0.36 –0.12 0.05 0.06 –0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1977 0.24 0.37 –0.13 0.08 0.10 –0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1978 0.18 0.30 –0.12 0.09 0.18 –0.08
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
1979 0.20 0.34 –0.15 0.06 0.12 –0.05
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1980 0.22 0.34 –0.12 0.07 0.06 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1981 0.28 0.36 –0.08 0.03 0.06 –0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
1982 0.26 0.39 –0.12 0.04 0.05 –0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
1983 0.30 0.39 –0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
1984 0.27 0.33 –0.05 0.06 0.08 –0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1985 0.27 0.30 –0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
1986 0.31 0.31 –0.00 0.03 0.04 –0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
1987 0.31 0.31 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
1988 0.29 0.32 –0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
1989 0.30 0.34 –0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
1990 0.32 0.31 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
1991 0.32 0.35 –0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
1992 0.31 0.34 –0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. For description of counterfactual weights see text.early part of our sample, union workers were more likely than nonunion
workers to desire more work hours. However, over the entire sample frame
the proportion constrained in this regard rose much more for nonunion
workers than for union workers so that beginning in the mid-1980s, the gap
between the two groups was numerically and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Similarly, the ﬁnal columns of the table show that union workers are
slightly less likely to desire fewer work hours; however, the small percent-
age of workers expressing this view means that the diﬀerence between
union and nonunion workers is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at con-
ventional levels.
7.3 Health Insurance, Pensions, and Other Beneﬁts
As suggested by the quote by Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1897) in our in-
troduction, labor unions have long played an important role in securing so-
cial insurance beneﬁts for workers. Indeed, according to Munts (1967),
many early union organizations were established for the provision of such
beneﬁts and only later became engaged in bargaining over wages. Later on,
pressure from organized labor provided signiﬁcant impetus for the growth
of pension plans in the 1940s and 1950s (Allen and Clark 1986).
There are several reasons to expect a positive eﬀect of union member-
ship on health insurance, retirement plans, and related beneﬁts.
First, in nonunion workplaces, where entry and exit are the primary ad-
justment by which worker preferences are expressed, compensation poli-
cies will be tailored to suit the “marginal” workers, who tend to be young
and mobile and therefore likely to have a low demand for health and re-
tirement beneﬁts. In contrast, the political processes of unionized work-
places often result in greater weight being placed on the preferences of
older, less-mobile workers, who are likely to have a greater demand for such
beneﬁts.12
Second, to the extent that unions play a role in administering beneﬁt pro-
grams, they may also lower the actual cost of such programs to employers.
In many cases, the union’s role involves providing information to employ-
ees about the value and tax advantages of nonwage beneﬁts, and thus in-
ﬂuencing employee demand. This notion of unions as providing informa-
tion to employees is consistent with the evidence that union workers are
more likely to take up publicly funded beneﬁts, such as workers’ compen-
sation and unemployment insurance (Hirsch, Macpherson, and Dumond
1997; Budd and McCall 1997). Also worthy of note is the possibility that in
repeated bargaining, established beneﬁts such as health insurance are diﬃ-
cult for the ﬁrm to eliminate—they become part of a nonnegotiable “base”
as compared to a negotiable “increment.”
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12. See Goldstein and Pauly (1976) for a more formal treatment.A number of studies from the 1970s and early 1980s show large union
eﬀects on the receipt and quantity of fringe beneﬁts, particularly health in-
surance and pensions (Freeman 1981; Alpert 1982; Freeman and Medoﬀ
1984; Feldman and Scheﬄer 1992; Allen and Clark 1986; Belman and Hey-
wood 1990). Pierce (2001) exploited the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
data used to compute the Employment Cost Index (for the years 1981–
1997) and found signiﬁcant union eﬀects on paid leave, pensions, and
health insurance. In this section we update this research by estimating the
relationship between union membership and health insurance and pen-
sions from the 1980s to the mid-1990s, using data from several special sup-
plements to the CPS. Both beneﬁts are very important from a policy per-
spective. There is great concern among health economists and other policy
analysts over the decline in health insurance coverage over the past several
decades (see, for example, Kronick and Gilmer 1999). Likewise, the aging
of the baby boom cohort combined with questions concerning the long-
run viability of Social Security heighten the policy importance of em-
ployer-sponsored retirement programs.
In the last part of this section, we also present union/nonunion diﬀer-
ences in the receipt of several other nonwage beneﬁts, using additional
data sources besides the CPS supplements. Largely for reasons of data
availability, we focus on the oﬀer or receipt of the various beneﬁts rather
than the level or generosity of coverage. Because several studies indicate
signiﬁcantly positive union eﬀects on the latter (Freeman 1981; Freeman
and Medoﬀ 1984; Allen and Clark 1986; Buchmueller, DiNardo, and Val-
letta 2002), the estimates we report here can be thought of as lower bounds
of sorts.
7.3.1 Health Insurance
Table 7.6 presents estimates of union/nonunion diﬀerences in health in-
surance beneﬁts for four diﬀerent periods: 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1997. The
data are from various supplements to the CPS. The 1983 data is the most
limited, providing information only on whether the responding worker re-
ceived health insurance coverage through his employer. For later years, 
it is possible to distinguish between whether a worker’s employer oﬀers
health beneﬁts to any workers and whether the worker is covered.13 The
third column in the table reports unadjusted union/nonunion diﬀerences
for these outcomes—that is, the diﬀerence between the ﬁgures in the ﬁrst
two columns. The adjusted diﬀerences in the fourth column are the coeﬃ-
cients on an indicator variable for union membership from linear proba-
bility models that also include individual characteristics and industry
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13. Conditional on ﬁrm oﬀers, coverage depends on whether a worker is eligible for bene-
ﬁts and take-up conditional on eligibility. See Buchmueller, DiNardo, and Valletta (2002) for
more detail on union/nonunion diﬀerences in these intermediate outcomes.dummy variables.14The ﬁfth column adds controls for ﬁrm size. This is our
preferred speciﬁcation as both health insurance coverage and union mem-
bership are positively related to ﬁrm size. The column (4) speciﬁcation is
reported because we would like to trace union eﬀects over the entire period
and information on ﬁrm size was not available in the 1997 data.
In each year, the percentage of union workers with health insurance is
substantially higher than the corresponding ﬁgure for nonunion workers,
and for both groups the percent covered fell over time. Since the decline be-
tween 1983 and 1997 was greater for union workers (10.3 percentage points
versus 5.1 percentage points), the union/nonunion diﬀerence also fell. A
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Table 7.6 Union/nonunion diﬀerences in health insurance availability and coverage
(CPS beneﬁts supplement data)
Diﬀerence (union-nonunion)
Union Nonunion Unadjusted Adjusted Adjusted (size)
A. 1983 (N   15,637)
Covered .929 .655 .274 .211 .151
(.009) (.009) (.008)
B. 1988 (N   15,254)
Available .938 .816 .122 .095 .039
(.008) (.009) (.009)
Covered .890 .668 .222 .152 .097
(.010) (.010) (.010)
C. 1993 (N   15,179)
Available .946 .792 .154 .141 .078
(.010) (.009) (.009)
Covered .870 .624 .246 .194 .132
(.012) (.011) (.011)
D. 1997 (N   8,144)
Available .928 .816 .112 .100 n.a.
(.013) (.013)
Covered .835 .620 .215 .175 n.a.
(.016) (.016)
Notes: All estimates were obtained using the survey supplement weights. Standard errors are
in parentheses. The estimates in the fourth column are the union coeﬃcients from linear prob-
ability models that also control for education (four category dummies), age, age squared, fe-
male, whether married, female by married, race/ethnicity (dummy variables for black and his-
panic), a dummy variable for metropolitan statistical area (MSA) residency, three region
dummies, and eight major industry dummies. The adjusted diﬀerences in the ﬁnal column are
based on a speciﬁcation that also includes ﬁve establishment size dummies (10–24, 25–49,
50–99, and 100–249, 250 ;  10 is the omitted category; four dummies in 1983); n.a.   not
available.
14. Using some of the same data we use here, Even and Macpherson (1993) show that esti-
mates of union/nonunion diﬀerences in health insurance and pension receipt are fairly robust
to alternative econometric speciﬁcation. We use linear probability models for their ease of in-
terpretation.comparison of the estimates for 1988 and 1997 suggest that for both sec-
tors the decline in coverage was not driven by a cutback in employer oﬀers
but, rather, in the percentage of workers in insurance-providing ﬁrms that
are covered, a result that has been documented in other studies (Cooper
and Schone 1997; Farber and Levy 2000).
Diﬀerences in worker and ﬁrm characteristics account for roughly half
of the union/nonunion diﬀerence in health insurance coverage. When the
regression controls for ﬁrm size, the adjusted diﬀerence falls from 15 per-
centage points in 1983 to 9.7 percentage points in 1988 before increasing to
13.2 percentage points in 1993.15
One interesting pattern in table 7.6 is that, for all years, the union eﬀect
on coverage is greater than the eﬀect on oﬀers. Unreported regressions re-
veal that this is due to the fact that within ﬁrms where insurance is avail-
able there are positive union eﬀects on both the probability of being eligi-
ble for coverage and take-up among eligible workers. These two eﬀects have
opposing time trends. The adjusted union/nonunion diﬀerence in the prob-
ability a worker is eligible for coverage, conditional on employer provision,
fell from 6 percentage points in 1988 to 2 percentage points in 1997 (with-
out controlling for ﬁrm size). The comparable diﬀerence in take-up rates
(conditional on being eligible for coverage) increases from 3 to 10 percent-
age points over this same period.
The higher take-up rate for union workers is partly explained by their
lower required employee contributions and more generous beneﬁts avail-
able in oﬀered plans. Table 7.7lists the evidence for this, which comes from
a 1993 survey of employers conducted by the Robert Wood Johnson Foun-
dation.16 Adjusting for establishment characteristics (size, industry, state,
years in business, and employee demographics), the mean employer pre-
mium contribution (expressed as a percentage of the premium) is between
9 and 10 percent higher in unionized establishments. Part of this diﬀerence
arises from the fact that establishments with union workers are between 15
and 20 percent (depending on coverage tier—i.e., single or family) more
likely to pay the full cost of coverage (results not listed).
In terms of plan beneﬁts, indemnity and PPO plans oﬀered to union em-
ployees have signiﬁcantly lower deductibles. For preferred provider organ-
ization (PPO) plans, the mean in-network and out-of-network coinsurance
rates are 2 percentage points lower for union plans. Among health mainte-
nance organization (HMO) plans, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in oﬃce
visit co-payments between union and nonunion plans. The likely explana-
tion is that in the case of HMOs, provider panel size and “quality” are more
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15. Because insurance provision is essentially universal among ﬁrms with 100 or more em-
ployees, the union eﬀect on oﬀers reported here represent the average of large eﬀects for small
and medium-sized ﬁrms and zero eﬀects for larger ones. See Buchmueller, DiNardo, and Val-
letta (2002).
16. See Buchmueller, DiNardo, and Valletta (2002) for more details on this data set.important variables than co-payment rates for distinguishing between more-
or less-attractive plans. We have no data on these other plan attributes.
An aspect of employer-provided health insurance that has received
somewhat less attention from researchers, but is of increasing policy im-
portance, is retiree health beneﬁts. Because nongroup health insurance is
typically quite expensive and in some cases not available at any price for
older workers, retiree health beneﬁts make it possible for many workers to
retire before the age of sixty-ﬁve without suﬀering a loss of insurance cov-
erage. Also, there are substantial gaps in the coverage oﬀered by Medi-
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Table 7.7 Union eﬀects on employer premium contributions and health plan
cost sharing
Diﬀerence: 
union-nonunion  Mean 
(standard deviation) (standard error)
Union Nonunion Unadjusted Adjusted
Employer premium contribution 
(as a percent of premium)
Single coverage (N   19,450) 88.3 81.8 6.5 9.1
Family coverage (N   19,102) 76.3 64.9 11.4 10.1
Plan cost sharing: Indemnity plans 
(N   8,891)
Deductible ($) 200.05 300.70 –100.65 –54.32
(164.10) (164.10) (16.71) (18.69)
Coinsurance (%) 17.22 17.41 –0.19 –0.37
(9.16) (9.61) (1.25) (1.18)
PPOs (N   6,543)
In-network
Deductible ($) 163.64 206.46 –42.82 –14.17
(214.64) (257.48) (23.32) (21.05)
Coinsurance (%) 14.55 16.85 –2.31 –2.15
(10.18) (8.60) (1.12) (1.06)
Out-of-network
Deductible ($) 275.36 343.90 –68.64 –55.06
(286.14) (365.19) (27.05) (25.45)
Coinsurance (%) 25.88 27.88 –2.00 –2.23
(10.26) (11.25) (1.19) (1.08)
HMOs (N   4,753)
Oﬃce visit copayment ($) 6.62 7.25 –0.64 –0.46
(4.50) (4.48) (0.49) (0.52)
Notes: All ﬁgures are weighted by plan enrollment. Adjusted diﬀerences are based on linear
probability model regressions. The regression speciﬁcation includes indicator variables for es-
tablishment size (six categories), industry (ten categories), state, and whether or not the ﬁrm
has another location. The model also includes the percentage of workers in ﬁve demographic
categories (males under age twenty-ﬁve, females under age twenty-ﬁve, females aged twenty-
ﬁve to ﬁfty-four, males aged ﬁfty-ﬁve and older, females aged ﬁfty-ﬁve and older) and the nat-
ural log of the ratio of annual payroll to the number of employees. The regression standard
errors have been adjusted to account for establishments that oﬀer multiple plans.care—that is, no coverage for prescription drugs or health insurance from
a former employer that supplements Medicare provides signiﬁcant beneﬁts
for retirees over the age of sixty-ﬁve.
The 1993 CPS Beneﬁt Supplement and a 1988 supplement focusing on
retiree health beneﬁts provide information on whether current workers will
be eligible for employer-sponsored health insurance when they retire.
Union/nonunion diﬀerences estimated using these data are reported in
table 7.8. For each year, the sample is limited to workers between the ages
of forty-ﬁve and sixty-four whose employer oﬀers health insurance to ac-
tive employees.17
The ﬁgures in the ﬁrst panel of table 7.8 show that in 1988 there was a 10
percentage point diﬀerence in eligibility for retiree health coverage be-
tween union and nonunion workers (74 percent versus 64 percent). Con-
trolling for worker characteristics and employer’s industry produces an
adjusted diﬀerence of roughly half this magnitude. The union/nonunion
diﬀerence increased between 1988 and 1993 due to an increase in the per-
centage of union workers with retiree coverage and a decline among non-
union workers. Adjusting for all observables (including ﬁrm size) results 
in a 12.8 percentage point diﬀerence in 1993.
To summarize, the data from several CPS supplements show signiﬁcant,
though declining, union eﬀects on health insurance coverage. This trend is
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17. It is important to keep the second sample selection criterion (employer health insurance
oﬀers) in mind when interpreting the reported union eﬀects. The union eﬀect for all workers
combines the retiree coverage eﬀect with the eﬀect on employer oﬀers listed in table 7.6.
Table 7.8 Union-nonunion diﬀerences in retiree health beneﬁts (CPS beneﬁts
supplement data)
Diﬀerence (union-nonunion)
Union Nonunion Unadjusted Adjusted Adjusted (size)
A. 1988 retiree health insurance supplement (N   1,098)
Retiree coverage .740 .639 .101 .045 n.a.
(.031) (.034)
B. 1993 beneﬁts supplement (N   1,806)
Retiree coverage .766 .598 .167 .146 .128
(.026) (.029) (.028)
Notes: All estimates were obtained using the survey supplement weights. Standard errors are
in parentheses. The estimates in the fourth column are the union coeﬃcients from linear prob-
ability models that also control for education (four category dummies), age, age squared, fe-
male, whether married, female by married, race/ethnicity (dummy variables for black and
hispanic), a dummy variable for msa residency, three region dummies, and eight major in-
dustry dummies. The adjusted diﬀerences in the ﬁnal column are based on a speciﬁcation that
also includes ﬁve establishment size dummies (10–24, 25–49, 50–99, and 100–249, 250 ;  10
is the omitted category; four dummies in 1983); n.a.   not available.consistent with the notion of declining union bargaining power. However,
other results suggest a slightly more complicated story in which union
eﬀorts are increasingly focused not merely on getting employers to oﬀer
health insurance but, rather, on the scope and quality of the beneﬁts that
are oﬀered (including the availability of retiree beneﬁts).
7.3.2 Pensions
Table 7.9 presents our results on union/nonunion diﬀerences in pension
plans. The data are from the same CPS supplements used in the health in-
surance analysis, and the layout of table 7.9 is the same as table 7.6. As with
the health insurance analysis, we examine two outcomes: whether a pen-
sion is oﬀered by the worker’s ﬁrm and, if so, whether he or she is covered.
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Table 7.9 Union/nonunion diﬀerences in pension availability and coverage 
(CPS beneﬁts supplement data)
Diﬀerence (union-nonunion)
Union Nonunion Unadjusted Adjusted Adjusted (size)
A. 1983 (N   15,637)
Available .843 .494 .349 .310 .227
(.009) (.009) (.009)
Covered .766 .388 .378 .303 .236
(.009) (.009) (.009)
B. 1988 (N   15,254)
Available .868 .536 .333 .302 .212
(.011) (.011) (.010)
Covered .772 .415 .358 .281 .212
(.011) (.011) (.011)
C. 1993 (N   15,179)
Available .862 .586 .275 .268 .172
(.012) (.012) (.011)
Covered .750 .432 .318 .269 .196
(.012) (.012) (.011)
D. 1997 (N   8,371)
Available .820 .578 .242 .227 n.a.
(.017) (.016)
Covered .719 .438 .281 .236 n.a.
(.017) (.016)
Notes: All estimates were obtained using the survey supplement weights. Standard errors are
in parentheses. The estimates in the fourth column are the union coeﬃcients from linear prob-
ability models that also control for education (four category dummies), age, age squared, fe-
male, whether married, female by married, race/ethnicity (dummy variables for black and his-
panic), a dummy variable for metropolitan statistical area (MSA) residency, three region
dummies, and eight major industry dummies. The adjusted diﬀerences in the ﬁnal column are
based on a speciﬁcation that also includes ﬁve establishment size dummies (10–24, 25–49,
50–99, and 100–249, 250 ;  10 is the omitted category; four dummies in 1983); n.a.   not
available.For all years, the union/nonunion diﬀerences for pensions are larger
than those for health insurance. In 1983, union workers were nearly twice
as likely to participate in an employer-sponsored pension plan: 76.6 per-
cent versus 38.8 percent. This result is due mainly to a large diﬀerence in
whether the worker’s ﬁrm oﬀered a pension plan at all (84.3 percent versus
49.4 percent), though there also is a union edge in coverage conditional on
employer oﬀers (0.909 versus 0.784, ﬁgures not shown). Holding constant
worker and ﬁrm characteristics (including establishment size), in 1983
union workers were 23.4 percentage points more likely than nonunion
workers to participate in a pension plan.
Over time, the coverage rates for the two groups move in opposite direc-
tions, generally falling for union workers and increasing steadily for non-
union workers. In 1993, the adjusted union/nonunion diﬀerence was 19.6
percentage points according to our preferred speciﬁcation and 26.9 per-
centage points when we do not control for ﬁrm size. The more restricted spec-
iﬁcation implies a slightly smaller union eﬀect, though still large, of 23.5
percentage points in 1997.
7.3.3 Other Fringe Beneﬁts
The National Organizational Survey Data
In this section, we examine union eﬀects on a variety of other beneﬁts us-
ing data from the 1993 CPS Employee Beneﬁt Supplement and two other
surveys conducted in the 1990s–the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Sur-
vey (MEPS) and the 1991 National Organization Survey (NOS). Of the
three data sets we use in this section, only the NOS is not well known to la-
bor and health economists, so a few words are in order.
The 1991 NOS was designed for research on organizational behavior.18
The sample was drawn in the following way. Employed respondents to the
1991 General Social Survey (GSS), a nationally representative survey of
U.S. adults, were asked to provide the names of their employers. These or-
ganizations were then contacted, and their representatives were asked
about a number of organizational characteristics and policies, including
whether the organization provided a number of nonwage employee bene-
ﬁts. While previous researchers using the NOS have treated the organiza-
tion as the unit of observation,19 the public-use ﬁle contains both organi-
zation-level variables and the individual-level variables from the GSS,
including whether each respondent is a union member. We treat the com-
bined GSS/NOS as an individual-level data set and estimate the relation-
ship between an individual’s union status and the probability that his or her
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18. See Kalleberg et al. (1994) for an overview of the objectives of the NOS and Spaeth and
O’Rourke (1994) for details on its design and implementation.
19. For example, see Knoke (1994), Knoke and Ishio (1994), and Huﬀman (1999).employer oﬀers various beneﬁts. The drawback of these data is our inabil-
ity to identify whether the employee is eligible for oﬀered beneﬁts.
Results
Table 7.10 presents regression-adjusted union eﬀects on the receipt of
several fringe beneﬁts. The econometric speciﬁcation varies slightly across
these data sets due to diﬀerences in data availability, though in all cases it
is fairly comparable to our preferred speciﬁcation for the health insurance
and pension regressions discussed previously.
Each of the outcomes in this table is dichotomous (provided or not). The
top panel presents results for three types of insurance: dental, life, and
long-term disability. The results here are similar to what we ﬁnd for health
insurance and pension beneﬁts. For all three types of insurance, the ad-
justed union/nonunion diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. The diﬀerence
is largest for dental insurance (16.5 percentage points) and smallest for life
insurance (4.5 percentage points). In the case of long-term disability, our
two data sources provide fairly similar estimates—9 percentage points for
the 1991 NOS and 6 percentage points for the 1996 MEPS.20
The estimated union eﬀects on the various types of paid leave are gener-
ally smaller. All three of the surveys have information on paid sick leave.
The largest union eﬀect, and the only one that is statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels, is estimated using the 1993 CPS Employee Beneﬁt
Supplement. The estimate from the NOS is of a comparable magnitude
but, because of a much smaller sample size, is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In the NOS, the employers of union members are 6 percentage points
more likely to oﬀer some type of maternity leave. Unfortunately, the data
set provides no further details on the nature of that coverage—that is, paid
versus unpaid or length of time. There is a similarly sized union eﬀect on
vacation coverage from the 1996 MEPS. This is consistent with our previ-
ous evidence from the PSID. Union workers are more likely than nonunion
workers to have any paid vacation.
The last panel presents union/nonunion diﬀerences in dependent care
beneﬁts from the NOS. Those results indicate no signiﬁcant diﬀerence 
in the percentage of union and nonunion workers receiving employer-
sponsored child care or elder care beneﬁts. Given the unfortunately vague
way in which these last two outcomes are deﬁned—child care beneﬁts
could include anything from subsidized on-site day care to Section 125
beneﬁt programs that allow employees to pay child care expenses with their
money on a pretax basis—we are reluctant to read too much into these
results.
Finally, because the NOS and MEPS also contain information on pen-
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20. Given diﬀerences in survey design, we are reluctant to interpret diﬀerences across these
sources as reﬂecting time trends.sions and retirement plans, we also compute estimates similar to those in
section 7.3.2. The similarity of the estimates from all three data sets is re-
assuring.
7.4 Conclusions and Discussion
Consistent with other research, and with the comprehensive review in
Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984), we ﬁnd generally signiﬁcant union eﬀects on
the large variety of nonwage aspects of work that we can measure. For a
worker with the attributes of a typical union member, a union job oﬀers
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Table 7.10 Union eﬀects of fringe beneﬁts other than health insurance in the 1990s
Outcome Data set Adjusted union-nonunion
Other insurance
Dental 1991 NOS 0.165
(.045)
Life 1991 NOS 0.047
(0.037)
Long-term disability 1991 NOS 0.092
(0.045)
Pension/retirement plan
Oﬀered 1991 NOS 0.187
(0.041)









Maternity leave 1991 NOS 0.065
(0.037)
Paid vacation 1996 MEPS 0.062
(0.017)
Dependent care
Child care beneﬁts 1991 NOS –0.021
(0.040)
Elder care beneﬁts 1991 NOS –0.023
(0.041)
Notes: Estimated union-nonunion diﬀerences are based on linear probability models. All re-
gressions control for the following: age (and age squared), years of education (and education
squared), and indicator variables for gender, marital status (married/not married), gender  
marital status, ﬁrm size (ﬁve categories), geographic region (four categories) and race/ethnic-
ity. The NOS and CPS regressions also control for industry. The CPS and MEPS regression
controls for whether the individual lives in an MSA. The NOS sample sizes range from 636 to
650, depending on the outcome. Standard errors are in parentheses.more vacation, fewer hours per week, the greater likelihood of dental,
health, maternity, retirement, and pension beneﬁts, inter alia. We also un-
cover evidence that there has been a decline in the magnitude of the vari-
ous diﬀerentials over time. This is consistent with the decline in the extent
of unionization and possibly a decline in their inﬂuence within unionized
workplaces, although the inconsistency in measurement across our diﬀer-
ent data sets makes this conclusion tentative in some cases.
One open question is the extent to which our ﬁndings reﬂect a direct
causal impact of unionization on nonwage outcomes. For example, the re-
sults may instead reﬂect systematic worker sorting between union and
nonunion workplaces (endogenous unionization) so that omitted worker
characteristics and choices rather that unionization per se are the cause of
diﬀerences in beneﬁt outcomes.
Although our estimates did not account for endogenous unionization,
estimates of the union wage eﬀect using data on individuals that attempt to
account for endogeneity indicate a substantial positive, causal impact of
union status (see, for example, Robinson 1989). Moreover, Blau and Kahn
(2000) observe that the impacts of unionization are much the same whether
measured within countries over time or across countries subject to similar
global inﬂuences but with diﬀerences in unionization.
A related issue is the mechanism by which unions provide these “premi-
ums.” In most variants of the monopoly union model, union gains come ex-
clusively at the expense of nonunion workers and the level of economic ac-
tivity in the economy. The mechanism is straightforward—unions raise the
cost of inputs to the ﬁrms. Proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms respond by lowering
output and substituting away from the higher-priced input. Although this
view is widespread among economists, direct supporting evidence is quite
scarce. Indeed, the presence of a “deadweight welfare loss” to unionization
is a staple of textbook treatments of unionization. Even Freeman and
Medoﬀ (1984) who, inter alia, highlight the potential for allocation im-
provements under unionization, essentially stipulate the existence of such
a welfare loss, although they note that their estimate of this loss is small.21
More recent evidence from DiNardo and Lee (2001) suggests that the em-
ployment losses resulting from union impacts on establishment closure are
quite small.
Overall, our results suggest that unions have had substantive allocative
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21. The “Harberger triangle” in this setting equals one-half the product of the union wage
eﬀect, the associated employment decline in the union sector, the fraction of the workforce
unionized, and the fraction of total costs associated with labor. Assuming an elasticity of de-
mand for labor of –2/3, an upper bound to the union wage eﬀect of 25 percent, a union share
of the workforce of 25 percent in 1981, and a labor share of gross national product (GNP) of
3/4, Freeman and Medoﬀ (1989) estimate the eﬃciency loss as a share of GNP is 1/2   0.20
  0.13   0.25   0.75   0.0040. They note that this estimate is very close to the calculations
in Rees (1962).impact on important nonwage aspects of jobs. These include key beneﬁts,
such as health insurance and pensions, for which market conditions for
their provision have changed substantially in recent decades. The apparent
continuing union impact on these key beneﬁts may both provide a link to
the historical origins of the labor movement and a means by which unions
may continue to have important impacts on the terms and conditions of
employment in the future despite the decline in unionization.
Appendix A
A Simple Model
In this appendix we discuss a parameterization of a simple theoretical
model, due to Johnson (1990), of hours determination in a unionized set-
ting. The point of departure is the work of Pencavel and MaCurdy (1986)
and Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) and the class of models sometimes re-
ferred to as “contract curve” models (hereafter CC models), which consti-
tute an alternative to standard “labor demand” models of union behavior.
In the labor demand model, the eﬀect of unions is similar to that of the
minimum wage: the union raises the wage above the competitive level, lead-
ing to a decrease in employment (assuming hours per worker are ﬁxed). In
the basic CC model, however, the union is aware that its wage demands
aﬀect employment and takes that eﬀect into account when formulating its
bargaining stance. In Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), for example, the
union’s optimal choice for the level of employment maximizes ﬁrm proﬁts,
and any resulting rents are divided between the union and the owners of the
ﬁrm. As in implicit contract models, this process implies that the wage no
longer plays the allocative role it does in the simple textbook model and
that it is not possible to consider hours worked as the outcome solely of in-
dividual preferences interacting with a ﬁxed wage rate.
Johnson (1990) develops a variant of the basic CC model where hours
per worker are not ﬁxed and where the union negotiates jointly over wages,
employment levels, and hours worked per worker. As it is hard to rational-
ize hours of work decisions by union members as labor supply responses to
higher wages, this model provides a potentially useful framework for un-
derstanding the diﬀerences between hours worked in union and nonunion
environments.22
Proﬁts to a ﬁrm are given by a revenue function, V( ), that depends on
Unions and the Nonwage Aspects of Work 257
22. Estimating a standard labor supply equation, with union status used to instrument for
the wage, typically results in labor supply elasticity estimates that are much larger than those
found in other studies. See DiNardo (1992).total man-hours and labor costs, which equal the (average) wage rate times
total man-hours employed.23
(A1)   V[f(hN)]   whN,
where   is proﬁts, h is hours per worker, N is numbers of workers, and w is
average wage rate.
The union has preferences over individual worker utility as well as the
total number of employed members:
(A2) R   [U(wh,   h)   Ua] N
It is convenient to specify a speciﬁc (Stone-Geary) utility function with
utility increasing in earnings and decreasing in the number of hours
worked.
(A3) U(wh,   h)   (wh) (T   c   h)1  ,
where R( ) is the union objective function, T is total hours, c is committed
leisure,   is parameter of union preferences,   is parameter of individual
preferences, and Ua is nonunion utility.
Equation (A1) deﬁnes proﬁts for employers, equation (A2) deﬁnes union
utility, and equation (A3) is a simple characterization of individual prefer-
ences.
When   0, this model is a standard competitive model, and as   →  ,
the union cares more about wages and hours per worker. If unions and
ﬁrms negotiate over w, N, and h, the observed values of h and N for a given
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These two equations imply the following:
(A6) (V f  w)N    [U(wh,   h)   Ua]  1N(U1w   U2)
(A7) (V f  w)h   [U(wh,   h)   Ua] 
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23. A fuller analysis might treat labor as a quasi-ﬁxed factor as in Oi (1962) so that ﬁrms
might prefer fewer workers and greater hours per work. However, our simplifying assumption











where E is elasticity of utility with respect to income.
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The condition that   0 (unions place some emphasis on hours and
wages, and union workers are better oﬀ than their nonunion worker coun-
terparts) implies that union workers would prefer to work more hours at
the actual wage rate. The intuition underlying this result is straightforward.
In this model, the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between combinations of N and h that
yield the same amount of labor. By contrast, the union faces a trade-oﬀbe-
tween more members and higher utility per member.
Several implications that we can compare with the data include:
1. Union work hours generally will be less than nonunion hours.24
2. In addition to working less, union workers will be more likely to re-
port being constrained and desiring to work more hours at the union wage
rate.
3. The more union wage setting resembles wage setting in the “compet-
itive” sector (the smaller the diﬀerence between union member utility and
the nonunion alternative), the smaller is the hours diﬀerential and the less
“constrained” is the union hours outcome.
Appendix B
Statistical Methods for Reweighting
The procedure described here is a straightforward application of “propen-
sity score” weighting (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The exposition fol-
lows the discussion in DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and Johnston
and DiNardo (1997). Let the conditional distribution of hours in year iand
sector j be given by f i,j(hX   xb), let xb denote the characteristics of our
base sample and xi,j the characteristics of the sample that we wish to
reweight to have the same distribution of characteristics as the base
sample. We are interested in computing the counterfactual distribution
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24. This is not true for all possible utility functions; the key is that the worker’s utility-
constant “income eﬀect” of the higher wage should not be too large.  h   f i,j(hX   xb)dx,
by means of a reweighting of the actul distribution:
   h   f i,j(hX   xi,j)dx,
where   is the appropriate weight, and f i,j( ) is the distribution given the
structure of hours in year i. The counterfactual distribution yields the dis-
tribution of hours that would have obtained in year i for sector j had the
distribution of relevant characteristics in the population been xb instead of
xi,j. We can use this distribution to characterize the counterfactual mean
(or any other moment of the distribution).
Consider calculating  when we wish to reweight the 1972 distribution of
hours of nonunion members so that they have the same distribution of
characteristics as union workers in 1992.
We derive the appropriate weight by noting that the distribution of hours
worked among union workers in 1992 is given by
  f 92,U 1(hX   xb)dx    f 92(hX)g(XU   1, t   1992)dx,
where the term g(XU   1, t   1992) denotes the multivariate distribution
of X in the union sector in 1992.
The appropriate counterfactual distribution is given by
  f 72,U 0(hX   xb)dx    f 72,U 0(hX)g(XU   1, t   1992)dx,
where the term f 72,U 0 denotes the structure of hours (i.e., the relationship
between hours and characteristics) in the nonunion sector in 1972.
The actual distribution of hours in the nonunion sector in 1972 is given by
  f 72,U 0(hX)dx    f 72,U 0(hX)g(XU   0, t   1972)dx.
We merely need to solve for the value of   such that
  f 72,U 0(hX   xb)dx     f 72,U 0(hX)g(XU   0, t   1972)dx.
A simple application of Bayes law shows that
     .
We then compute the sequence of these counterfactual means, say, ∫ h  
f 72,j(hX   x1992,U 1)dx, ∫ h   f 73,j(hX   x92,U 1)dx, ∫ h   f 74,j(hX  
x92,U 1)dx, ...   ∫ h   f 92,j(hX   x92,U 1)dx, for both union and nonunion
sectors.
Pr[(U   1, t   1992)X]
    
1   Pr[(U   1, t   1992)X]
Pr[(U   1, t   1992)X]
   
Pr[(U   0, t   1972)X]
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parison—comparing the “same” individuals through time we look at
changes in the “structure of hours.” One advantage relative to a standard
regression framework is that if there is signiﬁcant “treatment-eﬀect hetero-
geneity,” the analysis holds constant the comparison group so that the rel-
ative “strength” of the union eﬀect over time can be easily gleaned from the
estimates.
As a practical matter, we compute the probabilities in the previous ex-
pression using a logit pooling the 1992 union member sample with the 1972
nonunion member sample. We use a complete set of race dummies, school
dummies, marital status dummies, SMSA dummies, and a cubic in age as
explanatory variables for the PSID data. For the CPS data we use ﬁve edu-
cation categories, ﬁve age categories, an SMSA dummy, three regional
dummies, marital status, and three race categories.
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